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RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts in Plaintiffs' opening brief is 
accurate and fairly stated according to the requirement that 
this court give deference to the Industrial Commission's 
findings. The statement of facts propounded in defendant's 
brief goes beyond the evidence and reasonable inferences. 
Overton suggests in several places that alcohol was not the 
cause of the accident. He also states that the "Investigating 
Officer's Report of Traffic Accident" indicates "many other 
possible causes" of defendant's accident. However, the record 
indicates that the Officer's Report limited the contributing 
factors which caused Overton's accident to driving under the 
influence of alcohol, speeding, and driving left of center. 
(R. at 335.) Any other factors on which defendant relies as 
alternative causes are best characterized as only conditions. 
Overton's suggestion that alcohol did not cause the 
accident is contradicted by the record which demonstrates 
that: (1) Overton consumed a substantial quantity of alcohol 
before the accident (R. at 336); (2) hospital records show 
intoxication as leading to the accident (R. at 240); (3) police 
officers charged Overton with driving under the influence of 
alcohol (R. at 57, 336); (4) Overton paid the fine for driving 
under the influence of alcohol (R. at 57, 97); and (5) Overton 
has a substantial history of alcohol abuse. (R. at 85-87.) 
Administrative Law Judge Janet L. Moffit found that even though 
"there was no proof that [Overton] lost control of the vehicle 
by intoxication, . . . it undoubtedly played some role." (R. at 
316.) Every entity or individual that had any connection with 
Overton's accident found that it was alcohol-related. See 
Plaintiffs' opening brief at Point III. 
Overton also contends that he did not concede that there 
should be a 15% reduction in workers' compensation benefits for 
his alcohol-caused accident. (Defendant's brief, p. 5.) The 
record does not support defendant's contention. Rather, the 
cited testimony of Overton's counsel Ms. Diana (R. at 42.) 
coupled with the Overton's complete failure to challenge the 
reduction which had been made from the beginning (R. at 34, 39) 
evidence that Overton conceded that the 15% reduction of 
compensation was appropriate. 
Defendant, without support from the record, also maintains 
that "Overton had the presence of mind to start the truck up 
again to drive himself back to Duchesne to seek medical atten-
tion." (Defendant's brief, p.4.) Overton's testimony contra-
dicts this statement. "[T]he next thing I knew the vehicle 
began to roll over. I have no further memory of this event 
until I was speaking to a Duchesne police officer. (R. at 
336.) "[I]t seemed like I lost consciousness or something. 
Because then the next thing I do know was that I was being 
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pulled over by either the Sheriff or one of his deputies." (R. 
at 96-97.) Overton had no presence of mind. Nor did he seek 
medical attention. The Sheriff requested it for him. (R. at 
58.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR IN REQUIRING THAT DEFENDANT'S 
INTOXICATION BE WILLFUL IN ORDER TO INVOKE 
THE 15% REDUCTION OF COMPENSATION IMPOSED BY 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-14. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "when there is purely 
a question of law presented, which is necessarily involved in 
the decision or the award, it is [the appellate court's] duty 
to determine that question." McKay Dee Hospital v. Industrial 
Commission, 598 P.2d 375, 376 (Utah 1979). In the instant 
case, Administrative Law Judge, Janet L. Moffit, addressed the 
legal issue of whether or not Section 35-1-14 requires "willful 
intoxication" to impose a 15% benefit reduction of compensa-
tion. Judge Moffit concluded that the 15% reduction did not 
apply to this matter because the "statute [§ 35-1-14] implies 
that willful conduct on the part of an employee is necessary." 
(R. at 316). 
This type of statutory interpretation, by necessity, con-
cerns "a question of law involved in the decision or award." 
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McKay Dee Hospital, 598 P.2d at 376. Therefore, because the 
Commission's central justification for not invoking the 15% 
reduction was the finding that Overton was not "willfully" 
intoxicated, this issue is subject to full review by this Court. 
Section 35-1-14 provides in pertinent part that: "Where 
injury is caused from the intoxication of the employee, compen-
sation provided for herein shall be reduced fifteen percent 
. . ." The plain meaning of this statutory language is a 
legislative condemnation of intoxication of any kind in 
connection with work-related accidents. In any event, it is 
difficult to see how the court might determine that an 
individual has become willfully intoxicated as opposed to 
unwillfully intoxicated. 
In interpreting the meaning of Section 35-1-14, it is 
important to note that both Utah law and general principals of 
statutory construction demand that statutes be read according 
to their plain meaning. Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc. 575 
P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978). Departure from the literal 
language and meaning of a statute is not justified when it 
produces absurd or unjust results. 2A Sutherland Stat. Const. 
§ 45.12. 
To infer that intoxication must be "willful," where such 
language is not used to describe intoxication, constitutes an 
unjustified departure from the literal language and meaning of 
-4-
Section 35-1-14. Overton suggests that because intoxication is 
included within the same statutory provision as "willful 
failures to use safety devices" and "willful failure to follow 
safety rules" the provision infers that intoxication must also 
be willful. However, the fact that the term "willful" is not 
used in the description of intoxication, while it was notice-
ably included within the description of each other separate 
type of conduct indicates that the term was not intended to 
modify intoxication. Utah law supports this plain meaning 
interpretation. 
In Lopez v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 660 P.2d 250, 251 (Utah 
1983), the Utah Supreme Court held that intoxication alone is 
sufficient to reduce a claimant's award if the claimant's 
accident is casually related to his intoxication. No require-
ment of willfulness was ever mentioned. Contrary to Overton's 
contention, the Lopez decision is directly on point because it 
interprets the application of Section 35-1-14 with respect to 
intoxication. If "willfulness" were required, the Lopez Court 
would have to have found that Lopez was willfully, deliberately 
and defiantly intoxicated before his award could be reduced. 
Such a finding was not made in Lopez because the statute 
contains no such requirement with respect to intoxication. 
Overton's argument that Van Waters and Rogers v. Workman, 
700 P.2d 1096 (Utah 1985) requires willful intoxication fails. 
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Workman considers a 15% reduction for "willful failure to use 
safety devices." In Workman, both sides agreed that the 
statute required "willful failure." The issue was what 
constituted "willful failure." Intoxication was not an issue. 
The Industrial Commission committed reversibLe error by 
requiring that Overton's intoxication be willful in order to 
invoke a 15% reduction of compensation. 
POINT II 
THE FACTS COMPEL A FINDING THAT OVERTON'S 
INJURIES WERE CAUSED FROM HIS INTOXICATION. 
Defendant Overton contends that his intoxication was not 
the proximate cause of his accident. The definition of 
proximate cause is helpful in demonstrating that Overton's 
analysis is flawed: 
An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act, 
or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the 
evidence in the case, that the act or omission played 
a substantial part in bringing about or actually caus-
ing the injury or damage . . . . (Emphasis added.) 
Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1103 (5th Ed. 1979). The 
overwhelming evidence coupled with Overton's own 
acknowledgement of his consumption of substantial amounts of 
alcohol demand the conclusion that Overton's accident was 
proximately caused by intoxication. 
As discussed in plaintiff's opening brief, no proof of 
causation was attempted because the 15% reduction was not 
challenged until the entry of the Industrial Commission's 
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Order. Nevertheless, the existing record demonstrates: (1) 
Overton's admitting physician reported that he was "ETOH" and 
diagnosed his condition as "ETOH." (R. at 248); (2) Overton 
was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (R. at 
335); (3) Overton expected conviction for the DUI charge, so he 
paid the $300 fine (R. at 57); and (4) Overton had a history of 
substantial drug/alcohol abuse. (R. at 85-87.) 
POINT III 
BECAUSE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE 15% 
REDUCTION OF COMPENSATION WENT UNCHALLENGED 
AND WAS NOT CONSIDERED UNTIL THE COMMISSION'S 
FINAL ORDER WAS ENTERED, FAIRNESS REQUIRES 
THAT PLAINTIFFS BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
PRESENT EVIDENCE ON THIS ISSUE. 
The 15% reduction of benefits had been taken by the 
employer without objection. The Administrative Law Judge 
outlined the issues before the hearing which did not include 
the 15% reduction. Overton did not challenge this. (R. at 
34.) When asked by the Judge at the hearing to identify 
additional issues, Overton did not identify the 15% reduction 
as an issue. (R. at 39.) When the employer stated that there 
was no dispute that a 15% reduction was applicable, Overton did 
not disagree. (R. at 42.) Overton offers absolutely no 
explanation for not challenging the 15% intoxication reduction 
when asked twice to identify disputed issues. Moreover, he 
offers no explanation for failing to refute the 15% reduction 
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when plaintiff represented to the Industrial Commission at the 
hearing that there was no dispute about the 15% reduction. (R. 
at 42.) The reasonable conclusion is that Overton conceded 
that the reduction was proper. 
Had Overton challenged the reduction, it would be reasona-
ble to expect presentation of the evidence. However, because 
the reduction was never challenged, raised or disputed, failure 
to present substantial evidence was justified. When the issue 
is identified as undisputed and the only response is "thank 
you," failure to offer further proof on the issue is excusa-
ble. To penalize plaintiffs for an alleged failure to offer 
additional evidence on a matter not at issue promotes surprise 
and unfairness. Plaintiffs respectfully encourage this Court 
to avoid such an unjust result. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons- stated herein, plaintiffs respectfully 
request this court to enter its Order that: (1) the Industrial 
Commission committed reversible error in requiring that intoxi-
cation be willful to impose a 15% reduction of compensation; 
(2) Overton's accident was caused from his intoxication; and 
(3) if additional evidence is necessary, that plaintiffs be 
granted a remand to present such evidence. 
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DATED this JJD_ it day of March, 1987. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Larry R. Laycock 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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